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Poverty and government transfers
in the United States
Dierk Herzer* and Rainer Klump
Department of Economics, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University,
Gru¨neburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
This article examines the long-term impact of government transfers on
poverty in the United States using cointegration techniques. In contrast to
most existing studies, we find that government transfers play an important
poverty-reducing role.
I. Introduction
The question of whether and how public transfer pay-
ments affect poverty in the United States has been
debated for decades, with no consensus in sight. At
the centre of this debate are basically two arguments.
The first, intuitively obvious argument, which is based
on the typically poverty-reducing role of public trans-
fers, is that transfers decrease poverty by raising the
incomes of the poor. According to the second argu-
ment, antipoverty benefits increase poverty by decreas-
ing the labour supply of current and all potential
future transfer recipients. The logic behind this is
that antipoverty benefits act as a substitute for income
from employment: increases in benefit payments thus
make dependency on the government more attractive
than the alternative of self-support. Furthermore, as
the marginal poor become more dependent upon
transfers and therefore spend less time working, their
skills depreciate, in turn reducing their chances of
finding a job, earning money and escaping poverty.
Hence, because of the negative impact of higher trans-
fer payments on work incentives, such payments can
substantially raise the poverty rate – not only by
increasing the number of transfer recipients but also
by increasing the duration of poverty (e.g. Gwartney
and McCaleb, 1985).
In fact, most empirical studies find neither any
poverty-reducing effect of government transfers (e.g.
Gottschalk and Danziger, 1984; Nieswiadomy et al.,
1991; Balke and Slottje, 1993; Haveman and
Schwabich, 2000; Formby and Kim, 2001; Vedder
and Gallaway, 2001; Enders and Hoover, 2003;
Hoover et al., 2004) nor even a statistically significant
positive relationship between transfer payments and
the poverty rate in the United States (e.g. Blank and
Blinder, 1986; Peterson and Rom, 1989; Gundersen
and Ziliak, 2004). To our knowledge, only the results
by Osberg (2000) and Hoynes et al. (2005) suggest that
government transfers lead to a statistically significant
reduction in the poverty rate.
However, a limitation to these poverty studies is
that they do not examine whether government trans-
fers and poverty are cointegrated and thus whether
there exists a long-term relationship between govern-
ment transfers and poverty. Specifically, the approach
in most of the prior studies is to use aggregate time-
series or long-term panel data (for the United States)
to estimate the relationship between benefit payments
and the poverty rate in growth rates or first differences
(e.g. Balke and Slottje, 1993; Formby and Kim, 2001;
Vedder and Gallaway, 2001; Enders and Hoover,
2003; Hoover et al., 2004). It is well known that the
use of stationary first differences (or growth rates)
avoids spurious correlations, but this approach pre-
cludes the possibility of a long-run or cointegrating
relationship between the level of government transfers
and the level of poverty a priori. Apart from that,
recent advances in time-series and panel econometrics
suggest that simply using first differences can lead to
serious misspecification biases if a long-run or cointe-
grating relationship between the levels of the variables
exists. Indeed, there are also some studies that esti-
mate standard regression models of the relationship
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between the level of government transfers and the
poverty rate (e.g. Gottschalk and Danziger, 1984;
Blank and Blinder, 1986; Nieswiadomy et al., 1991;
Haveman and Schwabisch, 2000; Gundersen and
Ziliak, 2004; Hoynes et al., 2005). However, such
regression models are subject to spurious correlation
if government transfers and poverty rates are nonsta-
tionary and not cointegrated. But even in the presence
of cointegration, standard regression models may pro-
duce biased results and, furthermore, the estimates are
not normally distributed, implying that the reported
significance levels may be misleading.
Thus, the objective of this article is to examine the
long-run impact of government transfers on US pov-
erty using cointegration techniques. To preview our
main result: We find that, although government trans-
fers have no statistically significant effects on the pov-
erty rate in the short run, they significantly reduce
poverty in the long run.
The rest of this article is organized as follows.
Section II describes the estimating equation and the
data. The empirical analysis is presented in Section III
and Section IV concludes.
II. Model and Data
To investigate the long-term impact of government
transfers on poverty in the United States, we use
aggregate annual time-series data. Following previous
studies (e.g. Enders and Hoover, 2003; Hoover et al.,
2004), we employ the official US Census Bureau
poverty rate as our measure of poverty, whereas our
measure of government transfers represents all gov-
ernment transfers to low-income families including
medical benefits and other noncash transfers such as
food stamps and public housing. The government
transfer data are from the Historical Tables of the
Budget of the US Government, Fiscal Year 2006,
and have been converted into real 2000 dollars using
the implicit Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator
from the National Income Accounts.
However, as Freeman (2001) points out, many poor
families, for whom government transfers are impor-
tant, rely more on labour income than on any other
resources. Consequently, as real wages rise, more
workers might be able to earn sufficient income to
escape poverty. To account for this, we include the
average real hourly earnings from the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics expressed in constant 2000 dollars.
Given that these data are available from 1964 onwards,
the estimation period is 1964 to 2004.
Moreover, several authors suggest that there should
be a variable that controls for the structure of
American families given the much higher poverty
rate among female-headed families than among the
total population (e.g. Enders and Hoover, 2003;
Hoover et al., 2004). We therefore include the number
of female-headed families from the March Current
Population Surveys of the US Census Bureau in our
poverty function.
Finally, given that the US poverty rate tends to rise
during business cycle downturns and to decline during
business cycle expansions, many authors emphasize
the need to control for business cycle effects (e.g.
Blank and Blinder, 1986; Hoover et al., 2004). To
account for this, we include the log-linear detrended1
GDP (in constant 2000 prices) as a proxy for the
business cycle. The GDP data used to calculate this
proxy variable are from the US Department of
Commerce.
Thus, the long-run poverty function we estimate is
of the form
ln Pt ¼ cþ 1 lnTt þ 2 lnEt þ 3 lnFt
þ 4Ct þ t t ¼ 1; : : : ; T T ¼ 41; (1)
where ln Pt is the logarithm of the poverty rate, ln Tt
stands for the logarithm of real government transfers,
ln Wt is the logarithm of the real wage, ln Ft repre-
sents the logarithm of the number of female family
heads, Ct denotes the business cycle and t is the usual
error term.
III. Empirical Analysis
Cointegration test
Standard unit root tests, as well as Perron structural
change tests, suggest that ln Pt, ln Tt, ln Wt and
ln Ft are integrated of order one (results not reported
here to save space). Consequently, the first step in our
analysis is an investigation of the cointegration prop-
erties of these time series. Note that the business cycle
variable is stationary [I(0)], thus already representing a
cointegrating relationship. Therefore, Ct is excluded
from the cointegration analysis of ln Pt, ln Tt, ln Wt
and ln Ft.
To test for cointegration between these four vari-
ables, we make use of the Johansen (1995) procedure.
The Johansen procedure is based on reformulating an
n-dimensional and kth-order vector (yt) to a vector
error correction model:
1Detrending using the Hodrick–Prescott filter gives the same results qualitatively.
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yt ¼
Xk1
i¼1
iyti þ yt1 þ  Dt þ "t; ð2Þ
where yt = [ ln Pt, ln Tt, ln Wt, ln Ft]¢ is a n · 1
vector of the first-order integrated [I(1)] variables, i is
an n · r matrix of short-run coefficients,  is a n · r
matrix of long-run parameters and  represents an
n · r matrix of coefficients on Dt, which is a vector of
deterministic terms, such as a constant term and a
linear time trend. If the data cointegrate,  must be
of reduced rank, r, n, with r as the number of distinct
cointegrating vectors, such that  = ’, where the
matrices  and  contain the adjustment parameters
and the cointegrating vectors, respectively.
As the determination of cointegration rank is essen-
tially a model specification problem, we use the
Schwarz model selection criterion (SC) to determine
the number of cointegrating vectors. The Schwarz
criterion has been shown to perform as well as, and
sometimes better than, the usual trace test and is com-
puted according to the following equation (e.g. Wang
and Bessler, 2005):
SC ¼ lnðdetð^ÞÞ þ J lnðTÞ=T; ð3Þ
where ^ is the maximum likelihood estimator of the
variance–covariance  of the innovation ("t’s) with
given lag order k and cointegration rank r and J is
the number of free parameters in the model, which
increases with k and r. Because all standard lag selec-
tion criteria unanimously select a two-lag model, we
calculate SC values for r = 0, 1, 2 and 3, conditional
on k - 1 = 2. Table 1 lists the results. Given that the
Schwarz criterion has a minimum at r = 1, we con-
clude that the variables are cointegrated with one
cointegrating vector.
Parameter estimation
Having found that the relation ln Pt  1 ln Tt  2
ln Et  3 ln Ft is stationary, we proceed under the
assumption that there is a long-run relationship
between ln Pt, ln Tt, ln Wt and ln Ft. Because the
business cycle is also stationary and because Ct is
expected to be an important explanatory variable in
the fully specified poverty function, the next step is to
include Ct in the long-run relationship. To this end,
we apply the Dynamic Ordinary-Least Square
(DOLS) estimation procedure of Stock and Watson
(1993). This procedure is robust to the presence
of potentially endogenous regressors and allows
us to obtain asymptotically efficient estimates of coin-
tegrated models with I(1) and I(0) variables. The
DOLS procedure involves regressing ln Pt on a
constant, ln Tt, ln Wt, ln Ft, Ct and on the leads,
lags and contemporaneous values of the first differ-
ences of ln Tt, ln Wt and ln Ft. The result of the
DOLS regression with one lead and one lag is
(t-statistics in parentheses beneath the estimated
coefficients)
ln Pt ¼ 1:389 0:343 ln Tt  1:564 ln Wt
ð1:39Þ ð6:90Þ ð9:16Þ
þ 0:740 ln Ft  1:885Ct
ð5:28Þ ð9:18Þ
þ
Xi¼þ1
i¼1
i lnðTtþiÞ þ
Xi¼þ1
i¼1
i lnðWtþiÞ
þ
Xi¼þ1
i¼1
’i lnðFtþiÞ (4)
R2 ¼ 0:96 JB ¼ 0:71 ð0:70Þ RESET ¼ 2:69ð0:11Þ
LMð1Þ ¼ 0:09ð0:76Þ LMð3Þ ¼ 0:44ð0:73Þ
LMð5Þ ¼ 0:25ð0:94Þ ARCHð1Þ ¼ 0:04ð0:83Þ
ARCHð2Þ ¼ 0:16ð0:85Þ ARCHð4Þ ¼ 0:20ð0:94Þ
where the numbers in parentheses behind the diag-
nostic test statistics are the corresponding p-values.
JB is the Jarque–Bera test for normality, RESET is
the usual test for general nonlinearity and misspe-
cification, LM(k) – k = 1, 3 and 5 – are Lagrange
Multiplier (LM) tests for autocorrelation based on
1, 3 and 5 lags, respectively, and ARCH(k) is an
LM test for autoregressive conditional heterosce-
dasticity of order k, k = 1, 2 and 4. As all p-values
exceed the conventional significance levels, we con-
clude that neither obvious nonlinearity nor misspe-
cification is present and that the residuals show no
signs of non-normality, autocorrelation or autore-
gressive heteroscedasticity. Thus, valid statistical
inferences can be drawn from the estimated
coefficients.
As expected, the effect of the business cycle on
poverty is substantial. The coefficient on Ct implies
that 1% upswing in the business cycle leads to 1.885%
decrease in the poverty rate, whereas business cycle
troughs increase poverty to the same extent. Also
consistent with our expectations, the poverty rate is
Table 1. Determination of the cointegration rank
r= 0 r= 1 r= 2 r= 3
SC -15.997 -16.285 -16.098 -15.751
The model includes an unrestricted constant.
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increased by the number of female family heads and
reduced by higher wages. The estimated relationship
suggests that 1% increase in female family heads is
associated with a 0.740% increase in poverty, whereas
1% increase in real wages is associated with 1.564%
decrease in poverty. Turning to the coefficient on
ln Tt, we see that the relationship between govern-
ment transfers and poverty is statistically significant
negative. More precisely, the coefficient on ln Tt
implies that the poverty rate decreases in the long
run by 0.343% because of a 1% increase in govern-
ment transfers. Thus, in contrast to most previous
studies, we find that government transfers play an
important poverty-reducing role.
Robustness
In the final step, we examine whether the results of
Sections ‘Cointegration test’ and ‘Parameter estima-
tion’ are robust to alternative estimation techniques.
To this end, we use a conditional error-correction
model, regressing  ln Pt, on ln Pt1, ln Tt1,
ln Wt1 and ln Ft1, the first differences of ln Tt,
ln Wt and ln Ft up to lag order two, Ct up to lag
order two, the lagged differences of ln Pt, also up to
lag order two, and an intercept term.Note thatCt does
not appear in first differences because the business
cycle is already stationary. After applying the general-
to-specific model reduction procedure, we obtain the
following equation (t-statistics in parentheses beneath
the estimated coefficients):
 ln Pt ¼ 1:200 0:522 ln Pt1  0:122 ln Tt1
ð1:42Þ ð7:14Þ ð2:53Þ
 0:488 ln Wt1 þ 0:289 lnFt1  1:082Ct
ð2:76Þ ð2:27Þ ð8:21Þ
þ 0:673 ln Ft  0:751 ln Wt
ð3:07Þ ð2:70Þ (5)
R2 ¼ 0:85 JB ¼ 0:66ð0:72Þ RESET ¼ 1:00ð0:32Þ
LMð1Þ ¼ 0:54ð0:47Þ LMð3Þ ¼ 0:70ð0:56Þ
LMð5Þ ¼ 1:43ð0:25Þ ARCHð1Þ ¼ 2:08ð0:16Þ
ARCHð2Þ ¼ 1:70ð0:20Þ ARCHð4Þ ¼ 1:36ð0:27Þ
As a significant negative coefficient of the lagged
dependent level variable indicates cointegration, the
t-statistic of the coefficient on ln Pt1 can be used to
test for cointegration. The corresponding finite-
sample critical values can be calculated from the
response surfaces in Ericsson and MacKinnon
(2002). Because the estimated t-statistic (-7.14)
exceeds, in absolute value, the finite-sample critical
value of 4:62 at the 1% level, the null of no coin-
tegration is clearly rejected.
Observe, moreover, that the short-run dynamics of
ln Tt are not significantly different from zero and
therefore do not appear in the equation. This implies
that government transfers have no short-term impact
on the poverty rate, suggesting that the (positive) work
disincentive effects compensate the (negative) income
effects of government transfers on the poverty rate in
the short run.
Normalizing on the coefficient of ln Pt1 in
Equation 5 finally yields the following long-run
relationship:
ln Pt ¼ 0:233 ln Tt  0:935 ln Wt
þ 0:554 ln Ft ð6Þ
Adding the (normalized) impact of the business
cycle gives the complete poverty function:
ln Pt ¼ 0:233 ln Tt  0:935 ln Wt
þ 0:554 ln Ft  2:073Ct (7)
which is close to the result of the DOLS procedure.
From this, it follows that the estimates are fairly
robust to different estimation techniques.
IV. Conclusion
This article has examined the long-run impact of gov-
ernment transfers on US poverty by applying cointe-
gration techniques to aggregate time-series data over
the period 1964 to 2004. In contrast to most previous
studies, we found that government transfers play an
important poverty-reducing role. Specifically, our
results suggest that, although government transfers
have no statistically significant short-term effects on
the poverty rate, they significantly reduce poverty in
the long run. In addition, we found that (i) an increase
in real wages is associated with a decrease in poverty;
(ii) an increase in single-mother families is associated
with an increase in the US poverty rate and
(iii) poverty in the United States is heavily influenced
by the business cycle. Summing up, our results demon-
strate how recent advances in time-series econometrics
can be used to shed more light on the determinants of
poverty.
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